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Abstract
Clean-label poisoning attacks inject innocuous
looking (and “correctly” labeled) poison images
into training data, causing a model to misclassify
a targeted image after being trained on this data.
We consider transferable poisoning attacks that
succeed without access to the victim network’s
outputs, architecture, or (in some cases) training
data. To achieve this, we propose a new “poly-
tope attack” in which poison images are designed
to surround the targeted image in feature space.
We also demonstrate that using Dropout during
poison creation helps to enhance transferability of
this attack. We achieve transferable attack success
rates of over 50% while poisoning only 1% of the
training set.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks require large datasets for training and
hyper-parameter tuning. As a result, many practitioners turn
to the web as a source for data, where one can automatically
scrape large datasets with little human oversight. Unfor-
tunately, recent results have demonstrated that these data
acquisition processes can lead to security vulnerabilities.
In particular, retrieving data from untrusted sources makes
models vulnerable to data poisoning attacks wherein an at-
tacker injects maliciously crafted examples into the training
set in order to hijack the model and control its behavior.
This paper is a call for attention to this security concern.
We explore effective and transferable clean-label poisoning
attacks on image classification problems. In general, data
poisoning attacks aim to control the model’s behavior during
inference by modifying its training data (Shafahi et al., 2018;
Suciu et al., 2018; Koh & Liang, 2017; Mahloujifar et al.,
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2017). In contrast to evasion attacks (Biggio et al., 2013;
Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015) and recently
proposed backdoor attacks (Liu et al., 2017; Chen et al.,
2017a; Turner et al., 2019), we study the case where the
targeted samples are not modified during inference.
Clean-label poisoning attacks differ from other poisoning
attacks (Biggio et al., 2012; Steinhardt et al., 2017) in a
critical way: they do not require the user to have any control
over the labeling process. Therefore, the poison images need
to maintain their malicious properties even when labeled
correctly by an expert. Such attacks open the door for a
unique threat model in which the attacker poisons datasets
simply by placing malicious images on the web, and waiting
for them to be harvested by web scraping bots, social media
platform operators, or other unsuspecting victims. Poisons
are then properly categorized by human labelers and used
during training. Furthermore, targeted clean label attacks
do not indiscriminately degrade test accuracy but rather
target misclassification of specific examples, rendering the
presence of the attack undetectable by looking at overall
model performance.
Clean-label poisoning attacks have been demonstrated only
in the white-box setting where the attacker has complete
knowledge of the victim model, and uses this knowledge
in the course of crafting poison examples (Shafahi et al.,
2018; Suciu et al., 2018). Black-box attacks of this type
have not been explored; thus, we aim to craft clean-label
poisons which transfer to unknown (black-box) deep image
classifiers.
It has been demonstrated in evasion attacks that with only
query access to the victim model, a substitute model can be
trained to craft adversarial perturbations that fool the victim
to classify the perturbed image into a specified class (Pa-
pernot et al., 2017). Compared to these attacks, transfer-
able poisoning attacks remain challenging for two reasons.
First, the victim’s decision boundary trained on the poisoned
dataset is more unpredictable than the unknown but fixed
decision boundary of an evasion attack victim. Second, the
attacker cannot depend on having direct access to the vic-
tim model (i.e. through queries) and must thus make the
poisons model-agnostic. The latter also makes the attack
more dangerous since the poisons can be administered in
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a distributed fashion (e.g. put on the web to be scraped),
compromising more than just one particular victim model.
Here, we demonstrate an approach to produce transferable
clean-label targeted poisoning attacks. We assume the at-
tacker has no access to the victim’s outputs or parameters,
but is able to collect a similar training set as that of the
victim. The attacker trains substitute models on this training
set, and optimizes a novel objective that forces the poisons
to form a polytope in feature space that entraps the target
inside its convex hull. A classifier that overfits to this poi-
soned data will classify the target into the same class as that
of the poisons. This new objective has better success rate
than feature collision (Shafahi et al., 2018) in the black-box
setting, and it becomes even more powerful when enforced
in multiple intermediate layers of the network, showing
high success rates in both transfer learning and end-to-end
training contexts. We also show that using Dropout when
crafting the poisons improves transferability.
2. The Threat Model
Like the poisoning attack of (Shafahi et al., 2018), the at-
tacker in our setting injects a small number of perturbed
samples (whose labels are true to their class) into the train-
ing set of the victim. The attacker’s goal is to cause the
victim network, once trained, to classify a test image (not
in the training set) as a specified class. We consider the
case of image classification, where the attacker achieves its
goal by adding adversarial perturbations δ to the images.
δ is crafted so that the perturbed image x + δ shares the
same class as the clean image x for a human labeler, while
being able to change the decision boundary of the DNNs in
a certain way.
Unlike (Shafahi et al., 2018) or (Papernot et al., 2017),
which requires full or query access to the victim model,
here we assume the victim model is not accessible to the
attacker, which is a practical assumption in many systems
such as autonomous vehicles and surveillance systems. In-
stead, we need the attacker to have knowledge about the
victim’s training distribution, such that a similar training set
can be collected for training substitute models.
We consider two learning approaches that the victim may
adopt. The first learning approach is transfer learning, in
which a pre-trained but frozen feature extractor φ, e.g., the
convolutional layers of a ResNet (He et al., 2016) trained
on a reference dataset like CIFAR or ImageNet, is applied
to images, and an application-specific linear classifier with
parametersW , b is fine-tuned on the features φ(X ) of an-
other dataset X . Transfer learning of this type is common
in industrial applications when large sets of labeled data are
unavailable for training a good feature extractor. Poisoning
attacks on transfer learning were first studied in the white-
Feature Collision Attack Convex Polytope Attack
Figure 1. An illustrative toy example of a linear SVM trained on
a two-dimensional space with training sets poisoned by Feature
Collision Attack and Convex Polytope Attack respectively. The
two striped red dots are the poisons injected to the training set,
while the striped blue dot is the target, which is not in the training
set. All other points are in the training set. Even when the poisons
are the closest points to the target, the optimal linear SVM will
classify the target correctly in the left figure. The Convex Polytope
attack will enforce a small distance of the line segment formed by
the two poisons to the target. When the line segment’s distance
to the target is minimized, the target’s negative margin in the re-
trained model is also minimized if it overfits.
box settings where the feature extractor is known in (Koh
& Liang, 2017; Shafahi et al., 2018), and similarly in (Mei
& Zhu, 2015; Biggio et al., 2012), all of which target linear
classifiers over deep features.
The second learning approach is end-to-end training, where
the feature extractor and the linear classifier are trained
jointly. Obviously, such a setting has stricter requirements
on the poisons than the transfer learning setting, since the
injected poisons will affect the parameters of the feature
extractor. (Shafahi et al., 2018) uses a watermarking strategy
that superposes up to 30% of the target image onto about 40
poison images, only to achieve about 60% success rate in a
10-way classification setting.
3. Transferable Targeted Poisoning Attacks
3.1. Difficulties of Targeted Poisoning Attacks
Targeted poisoning attacks are more difficult to pull off
than targeted evasion attacks. For image classification, tar-
geted evasion attacks only need to make the victim model
misclassify the perturbed image into a certain class. The
model does not adjust to the perturbation, so the attacker
only needs to find the shortest perturbation path to the deci-
sion boundary by solving a constrained optimization prob-
lem. For example, in the norm-bounded white-box set-
ting, the attacker can directly optimize δ to minimize the
cross entropy loss LCE on the target label yt by solving
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δt = argmin||δ||∞≤ LCE(xt + δ, yt) with Projected Gra-
dient Descent (Madry et al., 2017). In the norm-bounded
black-box setting, with query access, the attacker can also
train a substitute model to simulate the behavior of the vic-
tim via distillation, and perform the same optimization w.r.t.
the substitute model to find a transferable δ (Papernot et al.,
2017).
Targeted poisoning attacks, however, face a more challeng-
ing problem. The attacker needs to get the victim to classify
the target sample xt into the alternative target class y˜t after
being trained on the modified data distribution. One simple
approach is to select the poisons from class y˜t, and make
the poisons as close to xt as possible in the feature space. A
rational victim will usually overfit the training set, since it
is observed in practice that generalization keeps improving
even after training loss saturates (Zhang et al., 2016). As a
result, when the poisons are close to the target in the feature
space, a rational victim is likely to classify xt into y˜t since
the space near the poisons are classified as y˜t. However, as
shown in Figure 1, smaller distance to the target does not
always lead to a successful attack. In fact, being close to the
target might be too restrictive for successful attacks. Indeed,
there exists conditions where the poisons can be farther
away from the target, but the attack is more successful.
3.2. Feature Collision Attack
Feature collision attacks, as originally proposed in (Shafahi
et al., 2018), are a reliable way of producing targeted clean-
label poisons on white-box models. The attacker selects
a base example xb from the targeted class for crafting the
poisons xp, and tries to make xp become the same as the
target xt in the feature space by adding small adversarial
perturbations to xb. Specifically, the attacker solves the
following optimization problem (1) to craft the poisons:
xp = argmin
x
‖x− xb‖2 + µ‖φ(x)− φ(xt)‖2, (1)
where φ is a pre-trained neural feature extractor. The first
term enforces the poison to lie near the base in input space,
and therefore maintains the same label as xb to a human
labeler. The second term forces the feature representation
of the poison to collide with the feature representation of
the target. The hyperparameter µ > 0 trades off the balance
between these terms.
If the poison example xp is correctly labeled as a member of
the targeted class and placed in the victim’s training dataset
χ, then after training on χ, the victim classifier learns to
classify the poison’s feature representation into the targeted
class. Then, if xp’s feature distance to xt is smaller than
the margin of xp, xt will be classified into the same class as
xp and the attack is successful. Sometimes more than one
poison image is used to increase the success rate.
Unfortunately for the attacker, different feature extractors
φ will lead to different feature spaces, and a small feature
space distance dφ(xp,xt) = ‖φ(xp) − φ(xt)‖ for one
feature extractor does not guarantee a small distance for
another.
Fortunately, the results in (Trame`r et al., 2017) have demon-
strated that for each input sample, there exists an adversarial
subspace for different models trained on the same dataset,
such that a moderate perturbation can cause the models to
misclassify the sample, which indicates it is possible to find
a small perturbation to make the poisons xp close to the
target xt in the feature space for different models, as long
as the models are trained on the same dataset or similar data
distributions.
With such observation, the most obvious approach to forge
a black-box attack is to optimize a set of poisons {x(j)p }kj=1
to produce feature collisions for an ensemble of models
{φ(i)}mi=1, where m is the number of models in the ensem-
ble. Such a technique was also used in black-box evasion
attacks (Liu et al., 2016). Because different extractors pro-
duce feature vectors with different dimensions and magni-
tudes, we use the following normalized feature distance to
prevent any one network from dominating the objective due
to such biases:
LFC =
m∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
‖φ(i)(x(j)p )− φ(i)(xt)‖2
‖φ(i)(xt)‖2 . (2)
3.3. Convex Polytope Attack
One problem with the feature collision attack is the emer-
gence of obvious patterns of the target in the crafted per-
turbations. Unlike prevalent objectives for evasion attacks
which maximize single-entry losses like cross entropy, fea-
ture collision (Shafahi et al., 2018) enforces each entry of the
poison’s feature vector φ(xp) to be close to φ(xt), which
usually results in hundreds to thousands of constraints on
each poison image xp. What is worse, in the black-box
setting as Eq. 2, the poisoning objective forces a collision
over an ensemble of m networks, which further increases
the number of constraints on the poison images. With such
a large number of constraints, the optimizer often resorts
to pushing the poison images in a direction where obvious
patterns of the target will occur, therefore making xp look
like the target class. As a result, human workers will notice
the difference and take actions. Figure 9 shows a qualitative
example in the process of crafting poisons from images of
hook to attack a fish image with Eq. 2. Elements of the
target image that are evident in the poison images include
the fish’s tail in the top image and almost a whole fish in the
bottom image in column 3.
Another problem with Feature Collision Attack is its lack of
transferability. Feature Collision Attack tends to fail in the
black-box setting because it is difficult to make the poisons
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Target
(a) Base Images (b) FC Perturbations (c) CP Perturbations (d) FC Poisons (e) CP Poisons
∥δ∥1/n = 18.7,∥δ∥∞ = 26
∥δ∥1/n = 19.0,∥δ∥∞ = 26
∥δ∥1/n = 16.8,∥δ∥∞ = 26
∥δ∥1/n = 15.6,∥δ∥∞ = 26
Figure 2. A qualitative example of the difference in poison images generated by Feature Collision (FC) Attack and Convex Polytope (CP)
Attack. Both attacks aim to make the model mis-classify the target fish image on the left into a hook. We show two of the five hook images
that were used for the attack, along with their perturbations and the poison images here. Both attacks were successful, but unlike FC,
which demonstrated strong regularity in the perturbations and obvious fish patterns in the poison images, CP tends to have no obvious
pattern in its poisons. More details are provided in the supplementary.
close to xt for every model in the feature space. The feature
space of different feature extractors should be very different,
since neural networks are using one linear classifier to sepa-
rate the deep features φ(x), which has a unique solution if
φ(x) is given, but different networks usually have different
accuracies. Therefore, even if the poisons xp collide with
xt in the feature space of the substitute models, they prob-
ably do not collide with xt in the unknown target model,
due to the generalization error. As demonstrated by Fig-
ure 1, the attack is likely to fail even when xp has smaller
distance to xt than its intra-class samples. It is also imprac-
tical to ensemble too many substitute models to reduce such
error. We provide experimental results with the ensemble
Feature Collision Attack defined by Eq. 2 to show it can be
ineffective.
We therefore seek a looser constraint on the poisons, so
that the patterns of the target are not obvious in the poi-
son images and the requirements on generalization are re-
duced. Noticing (Shafahi et al., 2018) usually use multiple
poisons to attack one target, we start by deriving the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions on the set of poison features
{φ(x(j)p )}kj=1 such that the target xt will be classified into
the poison’s class.
Proposition 1. The following statements are equivalent:
1. Every linear classifier that classifies {φ(x(j)p )}kj=1 into
label `p will classify φ(xt) into label `p.
2. φ(xt) is a convex combination of {φ(x(j)p )}kj=1,
i.e., φ(xt) =
∑k
j=1 cjφ(x
(j)
p ), where c1, . . . , ck ≥
0,
∑k
j=1 cj = 1.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the supplementary
material. In words, a set of poisons from the same class
is guaranteed to alter the class label of a target into theirs
if that target’s feature vector lies in the convex polytope of
the poison feature vectors. We emphasize that this is a far
more relaxed condition than enforcing a feature collision—
it enables the poisons to lie much farther away from the
target while altering the labels on a much larger region of
space. As long as xt lives inside this region in the unknown
target model, and {x(j)p } are classified as expected, xt will
be classified as the same label as {x(j)p }.
With this observation, we optimize the set of poisons to-
wards forming a convex polytope in the feature space such
that the target’s feature vector will lie within or at least close
to the convex polytope. Specifically, we solve the following
optimization problem:
minimize
{c(i)},{x(j)p }
1
2
m∑
i=1
‖φ(i)(xt)−
∑k
j=1 c
(i)
j φ
(i)(x
(j)
p )‖2
‖φ(i)(xt)‖2
subject to
k∑
j=1
c
(i)
j = 1, c
(i)
j ≥ 0,∀i, j,
‖x(j)p − x(j)b ‖∞ ≤ ,∀j, (3)
where x(j)b is the clean image of the j-th poison, and  is the
maximum allowable perturbation such that the perturbations
are not immediately perceptible.
Eq. 3 simultaneously finds a set of poisons {x(j)p }, and
a set of convex combination coefficients {c(i)j } such that
the target lies in or close to the convex polytope of the
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poisons in the feature space of the m models. Notice the
coefficients {c(i)j } are untied, i.e., they are allowed to vary
across different models, which does not require φ(i)(xt)
to be close to any specific point in the polytope, including
the vertices {x(j)p }. Given the same amount of perturbation,
such an objective is also more relaxed than Feature Collision
Attack (Eq. 2) since Eq. 2 is a special case of Eq. 3 when
we fix c(i)j = 1/k. As a result, the poisons demonstrate
almost no patterns of the target, and the imperceptibility
of the attack is enhanced compared with feature collision
attack, as shown in Figure 9.
The most important benefit brought by the convex poly-
tope objective is the improved transferability. For Con-
vex Polytope Attack, xt does not need to align with a
specific point in the feature space of the unknown tar-
get model. It only needs to lie within the convex poly-
tope formed by the poisons. In the case where this con-
dition is not satisfied, Convex Polytope Attack still has
advantages over Feature Collision Attack. Suppose for a
given target model, a residual1 smaller than ρ will guar-
antee a successful attack2. For Feature Collision Attack,
the target’s feature needs to lie within a ρ-ball centered at
φ(t)(x
(j∗)
p ), where j∗ = argminj‖φ(t)(x(j)p ) − φ(t)(xt)‖.
For Convex Polytope Attack, the target’s feature could lie
within the ρ-expansion of the convex polytope formed by
{φ(t)(x(j)p )}kj=1, which has a larger volume than the afore-
mentioned ρ-ball, and thus tolerates larger generalization
error.
3.4. An Efficient Algorithm for Convex Polytope Attack
We optimize the non-convex and constrained problem (3)
using an alternating method that side-steps the difficulties
posed by the complexity of {φ(i)} and the convex polytope
constraints on {c(i)}. Given {x(j)p }kj=1, we use forward-
backward splitting (Goldstein et al., 2014) to find the the
optimal sets of coefficients {c(i)}. This step takes much
less computation than back-propagation through the neural
network, since the dimension of c(i) is usually small (in our
case a typical value is 5). Then, given the optimal {c(i)}
with respect to {x(j)p }, we take one gradient step to optimize
{x(j)p }, since back-propagation through the m networks is
relatively expensive. Finally, we project the poison images
to be within  units of the clean base image so that the
perturbation is not obvious, which is implemented as a clip
operation. We repeat this process to find the optimal set of
poisons and coefficients, as shown in Algorithm 1.
1For FC, it is minj‖φ(t)(x(j)p ) − φ(t)(xt)‖; for CP, it is
‖∑j c(t)j φ(t)(x(j)p )− φ(t)(xt)‖
2When the residual is small enough, φ(t)(xt) will not cross the
decision boundary if poisons are classified as expected.
In our experiments, we find that after the first iteration,
initializing {c(i)} to the value from the last iteration accel-
erates its convergence. We also find the loss in the target
network to bear high variance without momentum optimiz-
ers. Therefore, we choose Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014)
as the optimizer for the perturbations as it converges more
reliably than SGD in our case. Although the constraint on
the perturbation is `∞ norm, in contrast to (Dong et al.,
2018) and the common practices for crafting adversarial
perturbations such as FGSM (Kurakin et al., 2016), we do
not take the sign of the gradient, which further reduces the
variance caused by the flipping of signs when the update
step is already small.
Algorithm 1 Convex Polytope Attack
Data: Clean base images{x(j)b }kj=1, substitute networks
{φ(i)}mi=1, and maximum perturbation .
Result: A set of perturbed poison images {x(j)p }kj=1.
Initialize c(i) ← 1k1, x(j)p ← x(j)b
while not converged do
for i=1,. . . ,m do
A← [φ(i)(x(1)p ), . . . , φ(i)(x(k)p )]
α← 1/‖A>A‖2
while not converged do
c(i) ← c(i) − αA>(Ac(i) − φ(i)(xt))
project c(i) onto probability simplex
end
end
Gradient step on x(j)p with Adam
Clip x(j)p so that the infinity norm constraint is satisfied.
end
3.5. Multi-Layer Convex Polytope Attack
When the victim trains its feature extractor φ in addition
to the classifier (last layer), enforcing Convex Polytope
Attack only on the feature space of φ(i) is not enough for
a successful attack as we will show in experiments. In
this setting, the change in feature space caused by a model
trained on the poisoned data will also make the polytope
more difficult to transfer.
Unlike linear classifiers, deep neural networks have much
better generalization on image datasets. Since the poisons
all come from one class, the whole network can probably
generalize well enough to discriminate the distributions of
xt and xp, such that after trained with the poisoned dataset,
it will still classify xt correctly. As shown in Figure 7,
when CP attack is applied to the last layer’s features, the
lower capacity models like SENet18 and ResNet18 are more
susceptible to the poisons than other larger capacity models.
However, we know there probably exist poisons with small
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Figure 3. Loss curves of Feature Collision and Convex Polytope
Attack on the substitute models and the victim models, tested
using the target with index 2. Dropout improved the minimum
achievable test loss for the FC attack, and improved the test loss of
the CP attack significantly.
perturbations that are transferable to networks trained on
the poison distribution, as empirical evidence from (Trame`r
et al., 2017) have shown there exist a common adversarial
subspace for different models trained on the same dataset,
and naturally trained networks usually have large enough
Lipschitz to cause mis-classification (Szegedy et al., 2013),
which hopefully will also be capable of shifting the polytope
into such a subspace to lie close to xt.
One strategy to increase transferability to models trained
end-to-end on the poisoned dataset is to jointly apply Con-
vex Polytope Attack to multiple layers of the network. The
deep network is broken into shallow networks φ1, ..., φn by
depth, and the objective now becomes
minimize
{c(i)l },{x
(j)
p }
n∑
l=1
m∑
i=1
‖φ(i)1:l(xt)−
∑k
j=1 c
(i)
l,jφ
(i)
1:l(x
(j)
p )‖2
‖φ(i)1:l(xt)‖2
,
(4)
where φ(i)1:l is the concatenation from φ
(i)
1 to φ
(i)
l . Networks
similar to ResNet are broken into blocks separated by pool-
ing layers, and we let φ(i)l be the l-th layer of such blocks.
The optimal linear classifier trained with the features up to
φ1:l (l < n) will have worse generalization than the optimal
linear classifier trained with features of φ, and therefore the
feature of xt should have higher chance to deviate from the
features of the same class after training, which is a neces-
sary condition for a successful attack. Meanwhile, with such
an objective, the perturbation is optimized towards fooling
models with different depths, which further increases the va-
riety of the substitute models and adds to the transferability.
3.6. Improved Transferability via Network
Randomization
Even when trained on the same dataset, different models
have different accuracy and therefore different distributions
of the samples in the feature space. Ideally, if we craft the
poisons with arbitrarily many networks from the function
class of the target network then we should be able effec-
tively minimize Eq. 3 in the target network. It is, however,
impractical to ensemble a large number of networks due to
Group 1
Group 2
Figure 4. Qualitative results of the poisons crafted by FC and CP.
Each group shows the target along with five poisons crafted to
attack it, where the first row is the poisons crafted with FC, and
the second row is the poisons crafted with CP. In the first group,
the CP poisons fooled a DenseNet121 but FC poisons failed, in the
second group both succeeded. The second target’s image is more
noisy and is probably an outlier of the frog class, so it is easier to
attack. The poisons crafted by CP contain fewer patterns of xt
than with FC, and are harder to detect.
memory constraints.
To avoid ensembling too many models, we randomize the
networks with Dropout (Srivastava et al., 2014), turning it on
when crafting the poisons. In each iteration, each substitute
network φ(i) is randomly sampled from its function class by
shutting off each neuron with probability p, and multiplying
all the “on” neurons with 1/(1− p) to keep the expectation
unchanged. In this way, we can get an exponential (in depth)
number of different networks for free in terms of memory.
Such randomized networks increase transferability in our
experiments. One qualititative example is given in Figure 3.
4. Experiments
In the following, we will use CP and FC as abbrevi-
ations for Convex Polytope Attacks and Feature Colli-
sion attacks respectively. The code for the experiments
is available at https://github.com/zhuchen03/
ConvexPolytopePosioning.
Datasets In this section, all images come from the CI-
FAR10 dataset. If not explicitly specified, we take the first
4800 images from each of the 10 classes (a total of 48000
images) in the training set to pre-train the victim models
and the substitute models (φ(i)). We leave the test set in-
tact so that the accuracy of these models under different
settings can be evaluated on the standard test set and com-
pared directly with the benchmarks. A successful attack
should not only have unnoticeable image perturbations, but
also unchanged test accuracy after fine-tuning on the clean
and poisoned datasets. As shown in the supplementary, our
attack preserves the accuracy of the victim model compared
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with the accuracy of those tuned on the corresponding clean
dataset.
The remaining 2000 images of the training set serve as a
pool for selecting the target, crafting the poisons, and fine-
tuning the victim networks. We take the first 50 images from
each class (a total of 500 images) in this pool as the clean
fine-tuning dataset. This resembles the scenario where pre-
trained models on large datasets like Imagenet (Krizhevsky
et al., 2012) are fine-tuned on a similar but usually disjoint
dataset. We randomly selected “ship” as the target class, and
“frog” as the targeted image’s class, i.e., the attacker wants
to cause a particular frog image to be misclassified as a ship.
The poison images x(j)p across all experiments are crafted
from the first 5 images of the ship class in the 500-image
fine-tuning dataset. We evaluate the poison’s efficacy on the
next 50 images of the frog class. Each of these images is
evaluated independently as the target xt to collect statistics.
Again, the target images are not included in the training and
fine-tuning set.
Networks Two sets of substitute model architectures
are used in this paper. Set S1 includes SENet18 (Hu
et al., 2018), ResNet50 (He et al., 2016), ResNeXt29-
2x64d (Xie et al., 2017), DPN92 (Chen et al., 2017b), Mo-
bileNetV2 (Sandler et al., 2018) and GoogLeNet (Szegedy
et al., 2015). Set S2 includes all the architectures of S1
except for MobileNetV2 and GoogLeNet. S1 and S2 are
used in different experiments as specified below. ResNet18
and DenseNet121 (Huang et al., 2017) were used as the
black-box model architectures. The poisons are crafted on
models from the set of substitute model architectures. We
evaluate the poisoning attack against victim models from
the 6 different substitute model architectures as well as from
the 2 black-box model architectures. Each victim model,
however, was trained with different random seeds than the
substitute models. If the victim’s architecture appears in the
substitute models, we call it a gray-box setting; otherwise,
it is a black-box setting.
We add a Dropout layer at the output of each Inception block
for GoogLeNet, and in the middle of the convolution layers
of each Residual-like blocks for the other networks. We train
these models from scratch on the aforementioned 48000-
image training set with Dropout probabilities of 0, 0.2, 0.25
and 0.3, using the same architecture and hyperparameters
(except for Dropout) of a public repository3. The victim
models that we evaluate were not trained with Dropout.
Attacks We use the same 5 poison ship images to attack
each frog image. For the substitute models, we use 3 models
trained with Dropout probabilities of 0.2, 0.25, 0.3 from
each architecture, which results in 18 and 12 substitute
3https://github.com/kuangliu/
pytorch-cifar
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Figure 5. Success rates of FC and CP attacks on various models.
Notice the first six entries are the gray-box setting where the
models with same architecture but different weights are in the
substitute networks, while the last two entries are the black-box
setting.
models for S1 and S2 respectively. When crafting the
poisons, we use the same Dropout probability as the models
were trained with. For all our experiments, we set  =
0.1. We use Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with a relatively
large learning rate of 0.04 for crafting the poisons, since
the networks have been trained to have small gradients on
images similar to the training set. We perform no more
than 4000 iterations on the poison perturbations in each
experiment. Unless specified, we only enforce Eq. 3 on the
features of the last layer.
For the victim, we choose its hyperparameters during fine-
tuning such that it overfits the 500-image training set, which
satisfies the aforementioned rational victim assumption. In
the transfer learning setting, where only the final linear
classifier is fine-tuned, we use Adam with a large learning
rate of 0.1 to overfit. In the end-to-end setting, we use Adam
with a small learning rate of 10−4 to overfit.
4.1. Comparison with Feature Collision
We first compare the transferability of poisons generated by
FC and CP in the transfer learning training context. The
results are shown in Figure 5. We use set S1 of substitute
architectures. FC never achieves a success rate higher than
0.5, while CP achieves success rates higher or close to 0.5
in most cases. A qualitative example of the poisons crafted
by the two approaches is shown in Figure 4.
4.2. Importance of Training Set
Despite being much more successful than FC, questions
remain about how reliable CP will be when we have no
knowledge of the victim’s training set. In the last section,
we trained the substitute models on the same training set
as the victim. In Figure 6 we provide results for when the
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Figure 6. Success rates of Convex Polytope Attack, with poisons
crafted by substitute models trained on the first 2400 images of
each class of CIFAR10. The models corresponding to the three
settings are trained with samples indexed from 1201 to 3600, 1 to
4800 and 2401 to 4800, corresponding to the settings of 50%, 50%
and 0% training set overlaps respectively.
substitute models’ training sets are similar to (but mostly
different from) that of the victim. Such a setting is some-
times more realistic than the setting where no knowledge
of the victim’s training set is required, but query access to
the victim model is needed (Papernot et al., 2017), since
query access is not available for scenarios like surveillance.
We use the less ideal S2, which has 12 substitute models
from 4 different architectures. Results are evaluated in the
transfer learning setting. Even with no data overlap, CP
can still transfer to models with very different structure than
the substitute models in the black-box setting. In the 0%
overlap setting, the poisons transfer better to models with
higher capacity like DPN92 and DenseNet121 than to low-
capacity ones like SENet18 and MobileNetV2, probably
because high capacity models overfit more to their training
set. Overall, we see that CP may remain powerful without
access to the training data in the transfer learning setting, as
long as the victim’s model has good generalization.
4.3. End-to-End Training
A more challenging setting is when the victim adopts end-
to-end training. Unlike the transfer learning setting where
models with better generalization turn out to be more vul-
nerable, here good generalization may help such models
classify the target correctly despite the poisons. As shown
in Figure 7, CP attacks on the last layer’s feature is not
enough for transferability, leading to almost zero success-
ful attacks. It is interesting to see that the success rate on
ResNet50 is 0, which is an architecture in the substitute
models, while the success rate on ResNet18 is the highest,
which is not an architecture in the substitute models but
should have worse generalization.
Therefore, we enforce CP in multiple layers of the substi-
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Figure 7. Success rates of Convex Polytope Attack in the end-to-
end training setting. We use S2 for the substitute models.
tute models, which breaks the models into lower capacitie
ones and leads to much better results. In the gray-box set-
ting, all of the attacks achieved more than 0.6 success rates.
However, it remains very difficult to transfer to GoogLeNet,
which has a more different architecture than the substitute
models. It is therefore more difficult to find a direction to
make the convex polytope survive end-to-end training.
5. Conclusion
In summary, we have demonstrated an approach to enhance
the transferability of clean-labeled targeted poisoning at-
tacks. The main contribution is a new objective which con-
structs a convex polytope around the target image in feature
space, so that a linear classifier which overfits the poisoned
dataset is guaranteed to classify the target into the poisons’
class. We provided two practical ways to further improve
transferability. First, turn on Dropout while crafting poisons,
so that the objective samples from a variety (i.e. ensemble)
of networks with different structures. Second, enforce the
convex polytope objective in multiple layers, which enables
attack success even in end-to-end learning contexts. Ad-
ditionally, we found that transferability can depend on the
data distribution used to train the substitute model.
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A. Proof of Proposition 1
2 =⇒ 1
For multi-class problems, the condition for φ(x) to be clas-
sified as `p is
w>`pφ(x) + b`p > w
>
i φ(x) + bi, for all i 6= `p.
Each of these constraints is linear, and is satisfied by a
convex half-space. The region that satisfies all of these
constraints in an intersection of convex half-spaces, and so is
convex. Under condition (2), φ(xt) is a convex combination
of points in this convex region, and so φ(xt) is itself in this
convex region.
1 =⇒ 2
Suppose that (1) holds. Let
S = {
∑
i
ciφ(x
j
p)|
∑
i
ci = 1, 0 ≤ ci ≤ 1}
be the convex hull of the points {φ(xjp)}kj=1. Let ut =
argminu∈S ‖u − φ(xt)‖ be the closest point to φ(xt) in
S. If ‖ut − φ(xt)‖ = 0, then (2) holds and the proof is
complete. If ‖ut − φ(xt)‖ > 0, then define the classifier
function
f(z) = (ut − φ(xt))>(z− ut).
Clearly f(φ(xt)) < 0. By condition (1), there is some j
with f(φ(xjp)) < 0 as well. Consider the function
g(η) =
1
2
‖ut + η(φ(xjp)− ut)− φ(xt)‖2.
Because ut is the closest point to φ(xt) in S, and g is
smooth, the derivative of g with respect to η, evaluated at
η = 0, is 0. We can write this derivative condition as
g′(0) = (ut − φ(xt))>(φ(xjp)− ut) = f(φ(xjp)) ≥ 0.
However this statement is a contradiction, since f(φ(xjp)) <
0.
B. Comparison of Validation Accuracies
To make data poisoning attacks undetectable, in addition
to making the perturbations to nonobvious, the accuracy of
the model fine-tuned on the poisoned dataset shall not drop
too significantly, compared with fine-tuning on the same
(except for the poisons) clean dataset. Figure 8 shows that
the drop in accuracy is indeed not obvious.
C. Details of the qualitative example
Both the target fish image and the five hook images used for
crafting poisons come from the WebVision (Li et al., 2017)
dataset, which has the same taxonomy as the ImageNet
dataset. Figure 9 gives all the five poison examples.
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Figure 8. Accuracies on the whole CIFAR10 test for models
trained or fine-tuned on different datasets. The fine-tuned models
are initialized with the network trained on the first 4800 images of
each class. There is little accuracy drop after fine-tuned on the poi-
soned datasets, compared with fine-tuning on the clean 500-image
set directly.
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Figure 9. All the 5 poison images.
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